






 66.3, July 2006, pp. 256–60. © Laurence Goldstein
 
Obviously (1) and (3) need not have the same truth-value. This is because
(2c) and (4) may differ in their truth-value. This resistance to substitution




 induces intensionality and
the intensional position is the position taken by the verb phrase.
Two points to conclude. First, notice that although the intensionality
above is related to the intensionality of sentential operators in (2c) or (4),
where the verbs explicitly expressing surprise are present, we cannot say
that this form of intensionality is thus reduced to sentential intensionality.
This is because (1) is not equivalent to (2c) and (3) is not equivalent to





tences, that is sentences which do not contain modals or propositional
attitude verbs, nor, by contrast with examples discussed in Saul 1997, do
they contain sentential connectives.
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The Creationist alternative to explanations within evolutionary theory of
such phenomena as the diversity of species and the fossil record has more
or less been jettisoned, thanks, in no small part, to the painstaking efforts
of philosophers such as Philip Kitcher (1982) who have exposed the
paucity and sometimes the downright duplicity of the Creationists’ argu-
ments. But many theists, including some rather distinguished scientists,
have remained unprepared to accept the theory of evolution, and an
alternative called Intelligent Design (ID) has, in recent years, gained wide
currency. ID does not insist on the literal truth of the Book of Genesis and
hence is not wedded to the claim that the universe was brought into being
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a mere 6,000 or so years ago. It does not insist that the stratification of
fossil deposits in rock is an effect of the way in which the waters subsided
after the Great Flood, so the discovery of the remnants of Noah’s ark is
not a priority for ID. Proponents of ID do not dispute the scientific
evidence that existing species have, to a certain extent, evolved over
the course of many generations, but they do question the credibility of the
claim that existing complex organisms could have evolved from scratch.
The crucial, and seemingly modest claim of ID is that it is simply unbe-
lievable that complex organisms such as the human eye, or complex
processes such as the Krebs cycle (in which energy useable by cells is
extracted from food) could have come into being through a long
evolutionary series of purely chance mutations unaided by any intelligent
guidance.
It is easy enough to produce complex (and sometimes rather beautiful)









 is a different matter, one that defies
not only belief but also, apparently, evolutionary theory. An incipient
wing, for example, would be a useless protruding bit of flesh, bone and
gristle that, far from lifting the creature off the ground, would slow it
down and provide a convenient grab-point for the jaws of voracious
predators. This transitional structure would thus be a useless appendage,
inhibiting, rather than improving, that creature’s chances of survival and
reproduction as compared with the chances of conspecifics not so lum-
bered. Therefore, according to evolutionary theory itself, birds should not
have evolved. By contrast, ID holds that the wings of birds are the product
of intelligent design and were created fully fledged and fully functional by
God. Evolutionary theorists, most prominently Richard Dawkins (2004),
have tried hard to demonstrate that intermediate forms on the evolution-
ary path to a complex structure could have thrived and multiplied, and,




 organic structures, the explanation looks reasonable,
and the evidence compelling. But it is fair to say that the argument has
not yet been won, and not just because of the ignorance, truculence or
dogmatism of its opponents. Proponents of ID have identified the weakest
point, the sticking point, as they see it, of evolutionary theory.
The evolutionary theorist has, I shall argue, a decisive response to this
problem of intermediate forms, but it involves abandoning a version of
the most widely held cosmological theory concerning the origin of the
universe. However, since that theory depends, unknown to most of its





Software/software.shtml for information on the software available in connection
with the Morph program mentioned in the appendix to Dawkins (1986).
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with the non-theistic tenor of evolutionary theory. The cosmological the-
ory to which I refer is popularly known as the Big Bang Theory. There
are technical problems with this theory and joke-philosophical ones (how




 there was nobody around to hear
it?) but I shall concentrate on a rather simple consideration.
According to the Big Bang theory, there was a particular point in time
(the First Big Bang or BB1) when matter came into existence. Some
proponents claim, more fancifully, that time itself came into existence at
that time. Objects come into, and go out of existence, and the mistake of
the latter view is to construe time itself as an object, an error exposed by
Kant (1781, ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, A31/B463–A33/B49). If an object
came into existence at a certain time, then there was a time before that
time when that object did not exist. But, if we think of time as an object
that came into existence at a particular time, then we would be saying –
absurdly – that there was a time before that particular time when time
did not exist. (The other possibility is that time is an object that has existed
for all time, but to what object could that second occurrence of the word
‘time’ refer?) We are obliged, therefore, to conclude that it is a mistake –
a conceptual error – to think of time as having a beginning, and this holds
true even if we do not conceive of time as an object. While it is plausible









, there is nothing beyond them (not a vast expanse of
nothingness), there seems to be no parallel consideration for positing an









A proponent of a less fanciful version of the Big Bang theory might
claim that, at some particular point in time (10 - 20 billion years ago is
the current favourite estimate), matter came into existence from nothing.
But this suggestion itself is hugely problematic. Why did this momentous








 And how could something
– a huge universe-inaugurating explosion – come from nothing? Kant
(1781 ‘The Second Analogy’, A189/B233 – A204/B249) claimed that the
principle of causation is true a priori, but even quantum theory (which
rejects that principle) does not countenance the spontaneous coming-into-




See the title of John Gribbin’s (1999). Gribbin informs me that he shares Stephen
Hawking’s view that talk of time before the Big Bang is as conceptually confused




This consideration will not burden those who hold (with Aristotle) that time does
not exist without change. For a defence of the contrary position, see Shoemaker
(1969).
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can come from nothing is a theistic one – God is the unique uncaused
cause that can bring matter into existence without Himself being material.
If we reject this theistic view, then we arrive at the mind-bending but









 (if the Big Bang theory is right, it is
presently confined to a sphere of at most a mere 40 billion light years in
diameter, so the chances of finding organic life like ours elsewhere in the




. We do not envisage
all matter ever going out of existence – it will continue to exist for the
infinite future – so we should be receptive to the idea that it has existed
for the infinite past. What this means for the evolutionary theorist is that





for false evolutionary starts. On millions and millions of occasions,
unpromising intermediate forms of organism could have developed but
disappeared because ambient conditions were not propitious for their
survival and luck was not with them. But that on just one occasion, luckily
evading all hazards, and given that the existing matter was not all inert,
the run of transitional phases culminated in our present amazing world,
can now be seen to be not a monumental improbability, but a racing
certainty. Another way of guaranteeing such certainty is to again postulate
an infinite history but with an infinite series of Big Bangs, each explosion
creating a new universe and correlatively infinitely new opportunities for
evolutionary processes to produce a wonderful variety of complex organ-
isms – without any assistance from a supernatural intelligence.
A quick calculation, on the basis that a human generational cycle
(equal to the average age at which female humans give birth) is 20 years,
indicates that, since the last Big Bang, the longest possible chain of con-
secutive mutations is approximately one billion. And, so it has been
claimed, a billion mutations are insufficient to generate a highly complex
organism from primeval slime. This argument is fallacious: the ‘quick
calculation’ is too quick. The generational cycle for present-day humans
may be 20 years but, in the early stages of the human evolutionary
process when the transitional forms were very simple, the generational
cycle may have been just a few days, or even just a few hours. The result











, a sophisticated variant of this view,
related to the old ‘Steady State’ theory, is defended by the physicists Paul Stein-





Useful critical comments from Peter Cave and Robin Taylor helped me to strengthen
the original argument.
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In a recent paper Peter Milne (2005) attempts to refute Truthmaker
Maximalism, the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing








: This sentence has no truthmaker




 is true and therefore is a truth without a truthmaker.




 has a truthmaker. Then it is true. If so, what it says
is the case, and so it has no truthmaker. So if it has a truthmaker, it




, it has no truthmaker. But








 is a truth without a
truthmaker.




 should not be assimilable
to the Liar. For in that case the sentence is not clearly a case of a truth
without a truthmaker. Furthermore, whatever solution the Truthmaker






Dan López de Sa and Elia Zardini (2006) have recently argued that
Milne’s argument must be wrong, since it allows one to prove the nega-
tion of basically anything. In this note I shall argue that Truthmaker
